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Horseplay by Employees
Howard L. Oleck*
A TENDENCY TO PLAY practical jokes is a characteristic that humans
share with other simians, and the best joke (to anthropoids) is the
pratfall-or the mirth aroused by the discomflture of a fellow human.
Nobody ever has surpassed, for bellylaugh purposes, the sight of a fellow
man slipping on a banana peel, especially if the banana peel was delib-
erately placed so as to trip the victim. Whatever this may suggest as to
the nobility of homo sapiens, few people will seriously deny the tendency
of humans to play practical jokes on each other.
Shakespeare put it in these words: "I'll use you for my mirth, yea
for my laughter ... ." I Mark Twain, that profoundly understanding stu-
dent of human nature, said of it, "Everything human is pathetic. The
secret source of Humor itself is not joy, but sorrow. There is no humor
in heaven." 2
Rough, coarse or boisterous practical joking has been called horse-
play since the year 1589. It was in that year that a stage play was pre-
sented in which one of the major parts was performed by an actual
horse.3 The resultant uproarious chaos on the stage (the horse not being
a particularly gifted actor) inevitably was described by the theatrical
critics (then, as now, eager to display their own literary talents) as a
horseplay. Thereafter this felicitous term was happily applied to any
kind of boisterously vulgar fun or conduct of "playful" nature-and still
is so applied. 4
Horseplay, of course, often results in actual physical injury to the
butt of the joke (no pun intended, even as to pratfalls), or at least men-
tal embarrassment or worse mental suffering. This fact is so well known
that one of the first cases recognizing the legally actionable nature of
some kinds of mental or emotional suffering (despite the danger of fake
claims) was one based on a practical joke. There, the joker amused him-
self by telling a woman that her husband had been badly injured in an
accident, which was untrue. She suffered severe emotional shock and
became very ill. The English court, outraged by such callous infliction
Distinguished Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
[Note: This is an unusual complete re-writing and expansion, into a technical
law review article, of an article for laymen, on Employers' Liabilities for Horseplay
by Employees, originally written by the same writer in 1966 for the Sunday Maga-
zine Section of The Plain Dealer (of Cleveland).]
1 Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act IV, Sc. 3, Line 49 (c. 1598-1600).
2 Samuel L. Clemens, Vol. I, Pudd'nhead Wilson's New Calendar, ch. 10 (1894).
3 Onions (ed.), Oxford Universal Dictionary on Historical Principles, 924 (3rd rev.
ed., with addenda, 1955).
4 Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, 702 (College ed.,
1956).
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of pain, awarded damages to the woman, when she later sued the come-
dian. This was the leading case to break through the long established
refusal of courts to award damages for negligent infliction of purely
mental suffering.5 Another typical case, in an American court, involved
a plaintiff's foolish gullibility in heeding a fortune teller's story about
buried treasure on her land. The defendants buried an old pot in the
land, and then "discovered" it, and gave it to the plaintiff. She followed
instructions found inside the pot cover, took the pot to her bank, and
there opened it. The defendants had arranged for a crowd to be there,
to mock and jeer the plaintiff. She sued for damages for her humiliation,
and recovered judgment for her mental suffering.6
Planting of a false story about a man, who supposedly had commit-
ted suicide, led to the story's being passed on to the man's mother, by
other people. The joker was sued for damages for negligent infliction of
mental anguish, and had to pay for his joke, in a Canadian court.7
Reasonable foreseeability of some harm is enough to sustain tort
liability, said an American court recently. In that case a man had set off
a firecracker outside his mother-in-law's window, as a joke. She was
startled, sprang up and ran, and tripped and fell. He was held liable for
damages.
8
The tortfeasor himself, of course, is and should be liable for negli-
gent infliction of harm. But the problem is not so simple when third
parties are involved. For example, should a city be held liable for boys'
rough-housing in a municipal auditorium corridor (an impromptu hockey
game) that led to a patron's being struck by a flying puck? The court
said "no," as the city's agents had not had enough notice or time to put
a stop to this horseplay.9 Similarly, a boy's camp was not held liable for
some boys having suspended a bucket in a cabin roof, to fall on a victim's
head, as a practical joke during an unsupervised rest period, for similar
reasons of lack of knowledge of the dangerous joke.10
In a different vein, a court held that a girl riding in an automobile
was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, in not
strongly resisting the male driver's sudden kissing of her cheek while he
was driving. This was a question for the jury, said the court, as to her
5 Wilkinson v. Downton (1897), 2 Q.B.D. 57. And see, for very similar facts and de-
cision, Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P. 2d 349 (1954).
6 Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 S. 37, 9 A.L.R. (1920); Noted, 34 Harv. L.R.
337 (1920).
7 Bielitzki v. Obadisk, 15 Sask. 153, 65 D.L.R. 627, 23 A.L.R. 351 (1922); Noted, 22
Columbia L.R. 86 (1922); 35 Harv. L.R. 348 (1922).
8 Slaughter v. Slaughter, 142 S.E. 2d 683 (No. Car. 1965). And see (sudden sounding
of auto horn in driveway is actionable) Brouillette v. City Bldg. Supply, 174 S. 2d
658 (La. 1965).
9 Aaser v. City of Charlotte, 144 S.E. 2d 610 (No. Car. 1965).
10 Kosok v. Y.M.C.A. of Greater N.Y., 264 N.Y.S. 2d 123 (1965).
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alleged contributory negligence; though the driver's antic clearly was
negligent.1 1 So, too, a "humorous" cutting-off of another car by a driver
did not amount to intention to cause the resulting accident, but was
negligence to which automobile liability insurance would apply.12
The Master and Servant Cases
A principal type of practical joke (horseplay) injury is that caused
by workmen trying to lighten the dull routine of work by playful fun
making. This involves the well established liability of a master for the
torts of his servant done in the course and scope of the employment."
It also involves the well-known limitation on respondeat superior that
results when an employee in effect abandons his employment by making
a detour from his business route, or by engaging in "a frolic of his
own." 14 This body of law has been greatly limited and changed (but not
totally abolished) by enactment of statutes, such as workmen's compen-
sation laws, that impose liability on the employer for almost anything
done in the course and scope of employment.1 And, of course, old
master-and-servant law still applies to many classes of cases which are
excluded from (or not covered by) workmen's compensation rules.16
The nature of the impact of workmen's compensation law on a
master's liability for torts of his servant is clearly indicated by a Penn-
sylvania decision of 1965. Pennsylvania's courts are hardly noted for
their forward-looking or paternalistic tendencies regarding working
people. In this case an employee, fired from his job, shot and killed the
foreman who had discharged him. This murder was done during business
hours, at a pier used by the company (a stevedore company) for employ-
ment "shape-ups." This certainly was "a frolic of his own" of the em-
ployee who did the shooting. Nevertheless, the victim's widow was
granted compensation, as for an injury suffered in the course and scope
of employment. Or, put otherwise, the murderous employee's act was
not held to be abandonment of his employment such as to relieve the
11 Hodges v. Nofsinger, 183 S. 2d 14 (Fla. 1966).
12 Murray v. Landenberger, 5 Ohio App. 2d 294, 215 N.E. 2d 412 (1966).
13 For full discussion and cases, see, Prosser, Torts, 472 et seq. (3rd ed., 1964); Re-
statement of Agency (2d) 220 (1) et seq.; Anno., 19 A.L.R. 226 (1922); 20 A.L.R. 684
(1923); 75 A.L.R. 725 (1931).
14 Joel v. Morrison (1834), 6 C.&P. 501, 172 Engl. Rep. 1338; op. cit. supra, n. 13;
James, Vicarious Liability, 28 Tulane L.R. 161 (1954); Tiffany, Agency 106 (2d ed.
1924); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Columbia L.R. 444, 716 (1923).
15 See, generally, Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (3rd ed., 1939, plus supple-
ments to date) 16 vols.; Larson, Workmen's Compensation (1952, plus supplements
to date) 2 vols.; Somers & Somers, Workmen's Compensation (1954).
16 See, Prosser, Torts, 556 et seq. (3rd ed., 1964) for various illustrations and cita-
tions, including such other, special statutes as F.E.L.A. or railroad statutes and the
like. And see, as to the Federal Employer's Liability Act, Richter & Forer, article,
67 Harv. L.R. 1003 (1954); McCord, The Federal RR. Safety Acts & the F.E.L.A., 17
Ohio St. L.J. 494 (1956).
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employer of liability. It was enough that the foreman was shot while
"on the job." 17
The unpredictability of court decisions in horseplay cases is well
illustrated by a rather ribald incident from Wisconsin:
A man was standing on the running board of a truck which was go-
ing thirty miles an hour. He was shouting, "Look! No Hands!," and he
was urinating. Suddenly the truck hit a bump and he was pitched off.
He was badly injured. A few days later he filed a claim against his boss,
for workmen's compensation.
"We certainly won't pay," said the boss. "You were violating not
one but two criminal statutes, aside from being an absolute damfool,
when you got hurt. It is against the law to stand on the running board
of a moving truck. And what you were doing violated the law against
indecent exposure. Do you expect to get paid for that?"
So this fellow sued him, and the high court of the State of Wisconsin
said solemnly, "Yes. In answering a call of nature, an employee does not
take himself out of the course of his employment." 18
Injuries to innocent bystanders who are outsiders, caused by horse-
play of employees at or near their work, are not common, but they do
occur. For example, in an Indiana case, several employees were outside
the plant where they worked, during their lunch hour. They knocked
down a passing pedestrian while they were rassling around. The boss
was not required to pay damages to the pedestrian. The workmen clear-
ly were "off on a frolic of their own." 19
Cases of office workers shooting paper clips with rubber bands, and
injuring their own eyes with rebounds, seem to occur constantly. Work-
men's compensation may be granted today, though the injuries nearly
amount to self-inflicted wounds.20
Horseplay cases usually involve thoughtless playfulness on the job
-momentary foolery to relieve the tedium of work-with unexpected
disaster following. For instance, men working with airhoses seem to be
fascinated by their potential for fun. Skylarking with airhoses seems to
occur often. In an Arkansas case, two men were cleaning out a soybean
storage shed, using an airhose. One of them, in the delicate language of
the Arkansas court, "introduced air into the body" of the other, causing
death. Funneeee! The dead man's widow was granted death benefits
under the workmen's compensation law. In a very similar 1962 New
York case, an airhose was similarly used in lunch hour horseplay. The
less chintzy New York court bluntly said that air had been shot into the
17 Cox v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 212 A. 2d 909 (Penna. 1965).
18 Karlslyst v. Industrial Commission, 11 N.W. 2d 179 (Wis. 1943).
19 Reinhart v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 193 N.E. 2d 655 (Ind. App. 1963).
20 Matter of Johnston v. Lowe's, Inc., N.Y. App. Div., 3rd Dept., Apr. 28, 1960, re-
ported in N.Y. Times, p. 1 (Apr. 29, 1960) (3 to 2 decision). Contra: Horn v. Broad-
way Garage, 186 Okla. 535, 99 P. 2d 150 (1940).
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victim's anus, causing perforation and death. Compensation was award-
ed here, too, even though the aggressor in the horseplay had become the
victim. Both deaths were held to have been suffered "in the course and
scope of the employment." 21
The idea is that a certain amount of relaxation from strict attention
to the job is a necessary and tolerable thing, even if it is rough, coarse
or boisterous play.
A very common practical joke is the pulling of a chair out from
under somebody who is about to sit down. The not-very-noble human
animal gets a big kick out of seeing a fellow human fall on his rump.
The pratfall is standard American humor.
In a Michigan case an employee pulled a chair out from under a
buddy on the job. The victim suffered unfunny injury as a result. The
boss knew of the comedian's tendency to play practical jokes, from prior
incidents, but had kept him on just the same. The court held the em-
ployer liable for failure to assure the injured man "a safe place to
work." 22
But in another chair-pulling case, in Missouri, in the same year, the
boss was not held liable. Here, a salesman of his, while calling on a cus-
tomer, was dumped by a newsboy at the office of the customer. Cer-
tainly a salesman making a business call would seem to be "in the course
of his employment." "True, true," said the court, "but the injury was
not one arising out of the employment." No compensation was allowed.
If this seems a rather subtle distinction, cheer up, you have lots of
company. 23
In early workmen's compensation laws, injuries caused by horse-
play did not qualify a worker for compensation. Mishaps caused by
machines could qualify as accidents, but not those caused by fellow-
employees. Just as intentional assaults by co-employees usually were
ruled out as personal matters, so were playful injuries.
Assault "frolics" are particularly confusing. In a 1965 Georgia case
a worker quarreled with a co-worker, and shot him. The claimant was
not the aggressor, and was granted compensation benefits. 24 A Kentucky
court held likewise, 25 and so did a Pennsylvania court,26 and a Massa-
21 Piatek v. Plymouth Rock Provision Co., 15 A.D. 2d 405, 224 N.Y.S. 2d 634 (1962);
Southern Cotton Oil Div. v. Childress, 377 S.W. 2d 167 (Ark. 1964). And for other
airhose cases, see, Larson, Workmen's Comp., § 23.50, n. 25, 26 (1966 rev.).
22 Dull v. N.Y.C. R.R., 196 F. Supp. 120 (D.C. Mich. 1961). And see, Loftus, Em-
ployer's Duty to Know Deficiencies of Employees, 16 Clev-Mar. L. R. 143 (1967).
23 Gregory v. Lewis Sales Co., 348 S.W. 2d 743 (Mo. App. 1961).
24 Commercial Construction Co. v. Caldwell, 140 S.E. 2d 298 (Ga. 1965).
25 Hall v. Clark, 360 S.W. 2d 140 (Ky. 1962).
26 Dolan v. Linton's Lunch, 152 A. 2d 887 (Penna. 1959).
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chusetts court.27 But Tennessee 2 and New York29 courts said that an
assault is a purely personal project, not part of the course and scope of
employment ordinarily.
In the celebrated New York case of Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk
Mills, the great Justice Cardozo, in 1920, began the modern view of
horseplay injury cases. He viewed them as an inevitable part of work,
especially group work in factories, saying:
Whatever men and boys will do, when gathered together in such
surroundings, at all events if it is something reasonably to be ex-
pected, was one of the perils of his service .... The claimant was
injured, not merely while he was in a factory, but because he was
in the factory, in touch with associations and conditions inseparable
from factory life. The risks of such associations and conditions were
risks of the employment.30
Soon afterward, in another New York case, the rule was limited to
injuries to victims of horseplay. An aggressor, or instigator of horseplay
was barred from compensation if he got hurt. And this is still the rule
in many (probably in most) states.31
Predictability is a major factor. Human curiosity, for example, is
something that an employer ought to expect, and ought to guard against.
In a South Carolina case a garage attendant, washing a sheriff's car,
found in it what looked like a fascinating kind of billy club. He plucked
at a cotter pin in it. When the pin came out he soon discovered what the
thing was. It was a tear gas bomb that went off and nearly blinded him.
He was awarded compensation because curiosity about strange objects
was something to be expected; but an exactly similar occurrence in Wis-
consin resulted in denial of workmen's compensation benefits.
32
A "deviation" from work, of course, may amount to abandonment
of employment (and thus, of employee benefits). A worker hardly can
be said to have "abandoned the employment" in many such situations,
when the deviation is brief. But it is something else again, if his action
can reasonably be described as "a frolic of his own." If he distinctly has
forgotten all about the job, and is off on a project of his own, he will get
no compensation if an injury occurs. For example, a Kentucky bar-
tender got into an argument with a customer about who was the smart-
est one in the tavern. They started an I.Q. test of their own, and the
27 Rego v. Thomas Bros. Corp., 164 N.E. 2d 144 (Mass. 1960).
28 White v. Whiteway Pharmacy, 360 S.W. 2d 12 (Tenn. 1962).
29 Matter of Pryor v. Presbyterian Home for the Aged, 9 N.Y. 2d 869, 175 N.E. 2d
823 (1961).
30 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711 (1920).
31 See cases and discussion in, 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation, Secs. 23.20 et seq.
(1961, with 1968 cum. supp.); 99 C.J.S., Sec. 225, Skylarking and Practical Joking.
And as to the view of "aggressors" in assault cases, see supra, n. 24-29.
32 Maahs v. Industrial Comm., 130 N.W. 2d 845 (Wis. 1964).
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minion of Bacchus won. But the patron was a sore loser and invited the
barkeep outside for a continuation of the debate about who was the best
man. In the exchange outside, the bartender was badly mauled. He filed
a claim for workmen's compensation. No award was granted. He was
"off on a frolic of his own" and had abandoned his employment.3 3
When a volunteer fireman fooled around with a visiting fire chief
who also was the town policeman, he brushed the chief's cheek playfully
with a piece of paper and then stuffed it into the chief's pocket. The
chief was a good sport and playfully pulled his gun, which he also bran-
dished playfully. It fired, and the fireman was hit. Even though he was
the instigator, he got a compensation award.34
But in another case, in a Miami city office building an employee saw
a policeman take off his gun belt, remove the bullets from the gun, and
leave the weapon on a table while he went to another room. The em-
ployee picked up the gun and amused the rest of the office help by play-
ing Russian Roulette with the empty gun. He put no bullets into the
gun. However, the officer had missed one while emptying the gun. Our
hero blew his own brains out, and his widow filed a claim for death ben-
efits. No award was granted. He had abandoned his employment, said
the Florida court.35
"Course and scope" clearly were exceeded when a ranch worker
trespassed into the owner's home, found an "aerosol" can, opened it out
of curiosity, and had one eye blinded by a squirt of cleaning fluid from
the can.3
6
Too much is too much. An executive in a New York hotel on
a business trip, picked up a couple of babes in the cocktail lounge, got
gassed with them, and then showed off by walking on the lobby balcony
rail. He fell into the lobby, doing himself no good at all, and then filed
a claim for workmen's compensation. That definitely was not in the
course and scope of his employment, according to the New York court.37
But, contrariwise, a Connecticut workman who was teased by his
supervisor, who called him "a queer," promptly belted the foreman. He
was just as promptly canned by the roguish straw boss, and filed a claim
for unemployment compensation. He got it, too. The court said that his
reaction was a natural impulse, and not deliberate abandonment of the
job.38
In one rather extreme case, an Illinois court said that a hotel was
liable for the conduct of a bellhop who often got juiced while on the job,
33 Creekmore v. Workmen's Comp. Board, 382 S.W. 2d 196 (Ky. 1964).
34 County Comr's. of Anne Arundel County v. Cole, 206 A. 2d 553 (Md. 1965).
35 City of Miami v. Granlund, 153 S. 2d 830 (Fla. 1963).
36 Callahan v. Martin K. Eby Construc. Co., 391 P. 2d 315 (Kans. 1964).
37 Hancock v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 249 N.Y.S. 2d 243 (App. Div. 1964).
38 Guest v. Admin., Unemploy. Comp. Act, Conn., 174 A. 2d 545 (Conn., 1961).
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as the manager well knew. The hotel did not fire him, and one day he
took a passkey, while thoroughly tanked, went into the room of a lady
guest, and got fresh with her. Well, not exactly fresh; he raped her. She
sued the hotel. You would think that this was "a frolic of his own," if
ever there was one. But the court said that the employer who overlooks
continued misconduct of an employee should foresee an ultimate mess,
and should be held responsible for it.
3 9
The better view of the employer's knowledge of employees' pro-
pensities seems to be that of New York, of which it was said (in a fire-
cracker case):
• . . In some jurisdictions, particularly New York, a participant
may recover if the horseplay was a regular incident of the employ-
ment as distinguished from an isolated act. The question is "whether
claimant's act-which resulted in his injury-was a single, isolated
act or one of a series of similar incidents generally participated in,
to the employer's knowledge, by employees, sufficient to regularize
such conduct and stamp it as part and parcel of the employment."
Ognibene v. Rochester Mfg. Co., 298 N.Y. 85, 80 N.E. 2d 749, 750,
noted 34 Corn. L.Q. 460; Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law,
Sec. 23.41. The employer's knowledge of the practice, actual or con-
structive, is important. Liability under the Workmen's Compensation
Act is not based on the negligence of the employer in failing to stop
the horseplay. The knowledge or acquiescence in the practice is
material only as it sheds light upon the question of whether the
injury may be said to arise out of the employment. If the employer
could reasonably expect, with his knowledge of the situation, that
an injury might result to an employee from the horseplay, the injury
may be said to arise out of the employment .... 40
A Kentucky court put the same problem this way (where a store
attendant poured lighter fluid on a sleeping customer, and then set it
afire):
This case is not within the principle, as the appellant con-
tends it is, that a master is not legally liable for a wrongful act of
his servant which was outside the scope of his employment or not
within the contemplation or the service of his employment. The
case is under the rule that where an employer leaves one in charge
of his business during his absence and that one wrongfully does
something to injure a patron, which the employer has reason to
know he may do, the employer is liable therefor. He is deemed to
have delegated his obligation to protect and not to harm the patron.
The appellant's liability clearly comes within the latter rule .... 41
39 Danile v. Oak Park Arms Hotel, Inc., 203 N.E. 2d 706 (Ill. App., rehearing denied
1965). And see the Loftus article, op. cit. supra n. 22, as to an employer's duty to
know his employees' deficiencies.
40 Hayes Freight Lines v. Burns, 290 S.W. 2d 836 (Ky. App., 1956); cf., Socha v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 13 A.L.R. 513; 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 269;
Anno., 159 A.L.R. 319, 337.
41 Spears v. Burchett, 289 S.W. 2d 731 (Ky. App. 1956); Anno., 40 A.L.R. 1333.
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Some courts view almost any horseplay as abandonment of employ-
ment, sometimes. They say that any such conduct is purely personal,
and not binding on the employer.
42
But these cases usually involve the question of whether or not the
employer knew, or reasonably should have known, of horseplay tenden-
cies, and had reasonable opportunity to do something about it. 43 Where
an employer had forbidden horseplay, and a worker "goosed" a co-
worker who then hit him with a hot scraper, nevertheless compensation
was granted to the aggressor.
44
In a burn case in New Jersey, one man in a factory squirted water
on another, and the other threw lacquer thinner back, without thinking.
A nearby flame ignited the playful fellow. But he received workmen's
compensation, even though he was the instigator.
45
Gas station antics were involved in a Georgia case, where the station
attendants were whooping it up and shouting; to attract cars in, they
said. One passing motorist, distracted by the uproar, piled up his car,
and sued the station owner. No, said the court, the owner could never
have foreseen such wild goings on.
46
In instigator-injuries, most states allow awards where the boss
tended to tolerate horseplay. In a New York case a group of waiters in
a restaurant were in the habit of playfully jostling each other as they
passed and repassed the door between the kitchen and the dining room.
The boss had never raised any objection, seeming to think the frolicking
to be good for morale. Eventually one of the waiters was stabbed by
a knife which was in a tray carried by one of the playful garcons. He
got workmen's compensation. 47
If the kind of work being done is pretty sure to lead to horseplay,
the boss usually is liable even for the first bit of rough-housing. When
a Michigan grower hired a bunch of young boys to pick ripe tomatoes,
it took no crystal ball to foresee that sooner or later a tomato would be
thrown. 48 In a Colorado case some pistol-packing ranch hands were play-
fully teased into a quick-draw match. The instigator drew his gun so
42 Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Aveilhe, 116 A. 2d 162 (Mun. App., D.C.); and see, 57
C.J.S., Master and Servant, Sec. 574c, p. 327; Restatement, Agency Sec. 235(a); and
many cases cited in principal case.
43 Evanish v. V.F.W. Post No. 2717, 130 N.W. 2d 331 (Minn. 1964) (firecracker thrown
by bartender); and, matter of Bennett v. Dreier Steel Co., Inc., 9 N.Y. 2d 668 (1961),
affg. 8 A.D. 2d 178; but see Larson, op. cit. supra, at § 11.32 (b).
44 McKenzie v. Brixile Mfg. Co., 166 A. 2d 753 (N. J. 1961), affg. 161 A. 2d 276 (N.J.
App. 1960).
45 Diaz v. Newark Industrial Spraying, Inc., 159 A. 2d 462 (N.J. App. 1960).
46 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Johnson, 140 S.E. 2d 857 (Ga. 1965).
47 Industrial Commr. v. McCarthy, 295 N.Y. 443, 68 N.E. 2d 434 (1946).
48 Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 91 N.W. 2d 493 (1958).
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fast that he shot himself. This was so silly that no compensation was
allowed.
49
In the same vein, a South Carolina court held the boss to be not
liable when his workmen, fixing a coin-operated machine at a restaurant,
put a cage outside with a sign on it: "Danger, Mongoose," and turned
a trick mongoose loose on a patron, scaring her into fits. This was a de-
parture from employment, said the court, and practically an assault; so
the boss was not liable.50
In a Kentucky case, an old customer of a store came in and, for fun,
shouted "This is a holdup." The store employee reacted like a mon-
goose-sprang for a gun, and shot the comedian. The store owner was
held liable.5 1
It's kind of confusing, isn't it! If there is one thing that the average
man wants to see in a law, it is clarity. How can people obey the law if
nobody knows what it is? That "course and scope of employment" bit
sounds reasonable and simple; only it ain't, as you can plainly see.
The main idea of the better rule seems to be that sportive conduct by
employees will be viewed as a natural part of the job, if it somehow
seems clearly related to the employment. In fact, victimization by
pranks is recognized as an almost inevitable part of holding down a job.
Liquor, the most potent stimulant of foolishness known to man (next
to sex), led to two other cases in New York, in the same year, that
neatly split the legal hair of "employment." In one, at an end-of-run
cast drinking party in a theatre, a dancer was injured by a drunk and
was awarded compensation. 2 In the other, at an office Christmas party,
two employees had a drinking contest and one drank himself to death.
The trial court refused to grant death benefits to his widow, saying that
such concentrated guzzling was too personal a project to qualify as part
of the employment. But the appellate court reversed this blue-nosed
opinion.5 3
Curiosity also may be tolerable, on the job. So said a Maryland
court when a girl, sent aboard a ship to do some work, became curious
about a hole in the cabin wall. She looked into it, just in time to have
a dumbwaiter therein descend on her noggin. She was awarded work-
men's compensation.5 4 But an employee's visit to see a new company
lounge under construction was held to be deliberate abandonment of
49 McKnight v. Houck, 286 P. 279 (Colo. 1930).
50 Lane v. Modern Music, Inc., 136 S.E. 2d 713 (So. Car., 1964).
51 Frederick v. Collins, 378 S.W. 2d 617 (Ky. App. 1964).
52 Ex rel. John Martin v. C. A. Production Co., N. Y. App. Div., 3rd Dept., Aug. 13,
1959, reported in N. Y. Times, p. 12 (Aug. 14, 1959).
53 Herman v. Greenpoint Barrell & Drum Reconditioning Co., 7 N.Y. 2d 786, 163 N.E.
2d 343 (1959).
54 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Parker, 64 F. Supp. 615 (D. C., Md., 1946).
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employment, in the same state.5 5 Make sense out of that contradiction,
if you can.
Michigan held the throwing of a firecracker by an employee to be
not course of employment, when the noise deafened a fellow worker; and
an insurance policy was said to be not applicable to such injury.56 And
a worker deliberately jaywalking across a busy street, from the company
parking lot to the office entrance, and getting clobbered by a car, was
said to be not in the course of employment, in Georgia. 57
Some cases are hard to swallow-like the Minnesota decision that
a public skating rink operator had no particular duty to have its em-
ployees stop boys from "horsing around" by playing rough-house hockey
on the ice5 s; or, the Louisiana benevolence towards a swimming pool
lifeguard who was too careless to stop swimming races that caused injury
to a non-participant.5 9
More often, today, employers feel that they must tolerate workers'
foolery and carelessness. As to workmen, it surely is true that "a good
man, nowadays, is hard to find." This is why, for example, a stupid em-
ployee's throwing of his drink into a co-worker's face was deemed quite
alright, even though he was pushed through a glass door in reprisal.
These were ranch hands in a California bunkhouse-and permissiveness
seems to be the rule of the day, especially in golden California. °
It now seems that refusal of benefits to the aggressor is on the way
to becoming the minority view.61 Even in the usually conservative south-
ern states, the aggressor in horseplay injuries now usually is treated as
having suffered injury "in the course and scope of employment," and gets
compensation. 62 The same is true of minor deviations from the job, such
as "quick-draw" contests of policemen 63 ; but not for even minor dis-
obedience of instructions, such as riding in an elevator (for curiosity)
where a house cleaner had been told to stay only in areas designated for
his cleaning work assignment.64
It seems that what is really in the minds of the judges is the question
whether or not an injured employee quite clearly had brought his fate
55 Coates v. J. M. Bucheimer Co., 218 A. 2d 191 (Md. 1966).
56 Morrill v. Gallagher, 122 N.W. 2d 687 (Mich. 1963).
57 Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Eberhardt, 130 S.E. 2d 136 (Ga. App. 1963).
58 Diker v. City of St. Louis Park, 130 N.W. 2d 113 (Minn. 1964).
59 Benoit v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 169 S. 2d 925 (La. 1965).
60 Argonaut Insur. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Board, 55 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal.
App. 1967).
61 See, Taylor v. Traders & Genl. Ins. Co., 164 S. 2d 905 (Miss. 1964); Southern Cot-
ton Oil Co. v. Childress, 377 S.W. 2d 167 (Ark. 1964); Mercier's Case, 214 N.E. 2d 279(Mass. Super. 1966); and see cases cited in 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation,§ 23.50 et seq. (1968 suppl. cases). But see, below, the still-prevailing view (e.g., as
in Ohio), that refusal of benefits to the aggressor is the majority rule.
62 Ibid., and see, Ransom v. H. G. Hill Co., 326 S.W. 2d 659 (Tenn. 1959).
63 Employers Liab. Ins. Corp. v. Dull, 415 P. 2d 821 (Alaska 1966).
64 Hills v. Servicemaster of Conn. River Valley, Inc., 230 A. 2d 604 (Conn. 1967).
Sept. 1968
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1968
HORSEPLAY BY EMPLOYEES
on himself. This is the same kind of thinking that used to bar an award
to the instigator of skylarking on the job. But if horseplay is recognized
as natural and inevitable, why penalize the victim for doing what the
law expects him to do and allows him to do? The purpose of compen-
sation law is to protect workers from the dangers inherent in modern
group work, including the dangers caused by the nature of man himself.
Science says that man is descended from the monkeys, the great
jokers of the animal kingdom. We should not be at all surprised that
men are fond of fun, play and horseplay. We certainly ought not to
penalize them for inevitably following what is one of their best instincts
-the instinct for fun and laughter.
Of course, an employee or outsider can sue the employee whose
foolish action injured him, under the law of most states. But such law-
suits are rare. The employer, and his insurance company, are much
more likely to be financially able to pay. Anyhow, the cost of insurance
is passed on to the consumer in higher prices of goods and services.
The law as to horseplay, that used to protect the boss, now is tending
to protect the employee, even where the worker has been such a damfool
that most people would have no sympathy for him. But many courts still
say that the ultimate in social protectiveness is a rule that even asinine
horseplay on the job may be covered by workmen's compensation, or by
liability of the boss if outsiders are injured.
Ohio's decisions typify the schizophrenic view of employees' horse-
play that still is followed by the majority of the states; that is, that horse-
play injury on the job generally is compensable as to innocent workers
but not as to the aggressor or instigator employee.65 Curiously, the early
Ohio cases said that sportive acts are a normal part of the environment
of workmen on the job, and thus do entitle them to compensation if
injury results. 6
But since 1934 Ohio has taken a quite puritanical view. In that
year, an Ohio appellate court ruled that sportive acts are not part of the
job, and no compensation will be granted if injury results. In that case,
two freight handlers, waiting for more freight to be handled by them,
fooled around by throwing each other's hats on the ground. Then, in one
grab at a hat, the victim's eye was scratched, and he lost the sight of that
eye. No award was allowed.6 7
Thereafter, the Ohio decisions became even more bluenosed. A
friendly boxing scuffle by co-workers, in a 1939 case, begun in fun, de-
generated into a fight in earnest, and ended with the stabbing of one of
the men. No workmen's compensation benefits were allowed.68 A de-
65 Annot., 99 C.J.S. 225, Skylarking and Practical Joking.
66 East Ohio Gas Co. v. Coe, 42 Ohio App. 334, 182 N.E. 123 (1932).
67 Industrial Comm. v. Bankes, 127 Ohio St. 517, 189 N.E. 437 (1934).
68 Williams v. Industrial Comm., 63 Ohio App. 66, 25 N.E. 2d 315 (1939).
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parture from routine was held to be abandonment of the job, and not
covered by workmen's compensation.' 9 A small airline's pilot who
"buzzed" a boat in order to break the droning monotony of an over-
water flight, and crashed in the process, more recently, was held to have
abandoned his employee rights by this sportive deviation from routine
chauffeuring.70 And this same disapproving view of human foibles has
been followed in other Ohio cases.71
Northern Ohio, particularly, which was settled by Connecticut Yan-
kees, still usually clings to the early New England view of stiff sobriety
as virtue and of gayety as a product of the devil. This anachronism is all
the more curious in that so many northern Ohio people today are de-
scendants of eastern and southern European immigrants or of southern
Negroes, or are themselves immigrants of both types. Apparently, in
their zeal to adapt to the local environment, the newcomers outdo the
old inhabitants in their zealous affirmation of the self-righteous Puritan
Ethic of the transplanted early New Englanders.
It is odd, indeed, that the more compassionate and tolerant view of
human nature (especially of workmen's propensities) should develop in
the southern states primarily, as has been happening recently. The south,
usually viewed as positively reactionary, let alone conservative, is more
humane and kindly in this respect than the north which boasts of its
liberal atmosphere.
In the last analysis, the famous old test of whether or not the em-
ployee was off "on a frolic of his own" 72 is only part of the test of em-
ployee status in a horseplay case. Really, it boils down to whether or
not the risk of such a deviation from routine work ought to have been
considered to be a part of the enterprise. 73 It has been suggested that
modern insurance coverage has much bearing on the question, but that
is only a side issue.7 4 Simple, reasonable knowledge of human nature,
and of the degree of temptation to "goof-off" in a particular kind of work
or situation, might be better tests. But the best test of all is that of
human nature alone. That test tells us, clearly, that man's propensity for
horseplay is universal and omnipresent. It never really ought to surprise
any employer. Therefore, it is an inherent part of almost any employ-
ment of almost any human being. There is no such thing as "unexpected
horseplay."
69 Ashbrook v. Industrial Comm., 136 Ohio St. 115, 24 N.E. 2d 35 (1939).
70 Ruffi v. American Fly Away Service, 104 N.E. 2d 37 (Ohio App., 1950).
71 Rogers v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 153 Ohio St. 513, 92 N.E. 2d 677 (1950), 18
A.L.R. 2d 1363; Thornberry v. Oyler Bros. Inc., 164 Ohio St. 395, 131 N.E. 2d 383
(1955).
72 Baron Parke, in, Joel v. Morrison (1834), 6 C. & P. 501, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338.
73 Ryan v. Western Pacific Insur. Co., 242 Ore. 84, 408 P. 2d 84 (1965).
74 Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 Yale L. J. 554 (1961).
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